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POPPING PATENTED PILLS: EUROPE AND A DECADE’S DOSE OF
TRIPs
-- David Vaver* and Shamnad Basheer**
This paper considers some features of Europe’s approach to medicine, public health
and patents as it has developed during the decade since TRIPs came into force. It
then reviews what rights users have in relation to such patents and what duties right
holders may owe users. The following issues are discussed:
1. How patents on medicines are viewed in Europe;
2. How TRIPs has affected European law;
3. How bilateral agreements since TRIPs have affected Europe;
4. How user rights should be viewed under TRIPs;
5. Whether patents in the public health field are a special case.
1. How patents on medicines are viewed in Europe1
Some political and economic facts influence Europe’s approach to drug patenting.
First, pharmaceuticals are big business. The largest pharmaceutical businesses after
those of the US and Japan are in Germany, France and the UK. The UK alone sells
7% of the world’s pharmaceuticals, is the third largest direct exporter, and is said to
account for 10% of world pharmaceutical R&D expenditure.2 The business is heavily
concentrated in relatively few companies, and the trend towards greater concentration
has continued in the decade since TRIPs. A penumbra of smaller entities is also
involved in researching and producing new products, especially in biotechnologies.
Secondly, general European policy is to make health care available to all or
most of the populace regardless of ability to pay. The state, which carries a large part
of the cost of supplying medicine and health care, is keen on keeping drug prices low.
European policy therefore involves finding the right trade-off between two competing
goals: encouraging the drug industry to innovate through the lure of the high profits
patents can generate, while keeping health care costs socially affordable.
Thirdly, the standard story driving European policy is that, without patent
laws, the pharmaceutical industries could not survive in their present form; we should
get little research into new medicine, jobs would be lost, public health would suffer,
so everyone would be worse off. Whatever the truth of this tale, the patent laws have
*
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certainly shaped the pharmaceutical industry, and it in turn has shaped the laws of
which it is a major beneficiary.
It was largely big pharma that pushed the US, EU and Japan to include patent
provisions in TRIPs, and big pharma was largely responsible for the contents. It
continues to influence how TRIPs is enforced and renegotiated. The US trade
representative sounds little different from a drug company executive when he or she
negotiates, issues press statements, or puts countries on dreaded “watch lists”. Big
pharma is also a major force behind the strategy of bilateral free trade agreements that
include patent provisions designed to keep the generic drug industry off balance.
European governments have largely accepted the arguments of big pharma
that not only are patents necessary to encourage the production of better medicines,
but that those patents must also be strong. They must give their holders firm control
over the research, development, production and marketing of their new medicines
nationally and internationally. Ever more and better medicines will thus be produced.
The conservation movement’s motto that “less is more” is not big pharma’s – unless
“less” means (i) less governmental interference in how pharma runs its business, and
(ii) less rights for others to access patented inventions.
Despite consumer and public policy group pressure, the story just sketched
seems to reflect official EU policy: witness the post-TRIPs European directive on
patenting biotechnological inventions (“the biotech directive”).3
This 1998
instrument, itself the product of over a decade of bitter wrangling, presents the
argument for strong patents in its recitals.4 Although the directive deals only with
biotechnologies, the substitution of “medicines” for “biotechnology” would still
accurately reflect European thinking:
Biotechnology and genetic engineering are playing an increasingly important role in a broad
range of industries and the protection of biotechnological inventions will certainly be of
fundamental importance for the Community’s industrial development. In particular in the
field of genetic engineering, research and development require a considerable amount of highrisk investment and therefore only adequate legal protection can make them profitable.
Effective and harmonised protection throughout the Member States is essential in order to
maintain and encourage investment in the field of biotechnology. …
The development of biotechnology is important to developing countries, both in the
field of health and combating major epidemics and endemic diseases and in that of combating
hunger in the world. The patent system should likewise be used to encourage research in
these fields. International procedures for the dissemination of such technology in the Third
World and to the benefit of the population groups concerned should be promoted. …
Substantive patent law cannot serve to replace or render superfluous national,
European or international law which may impose restrictions or prohibitions or which
concerns the monitoring of research and of the use or commercialisation of its results, notably
from the point of view of the requirements of public health [and] safety…
Significant progress in the treatment of diseases has already been made thanks to the
existence of medicinal products derived from elements isolated from the human body and/or
otherwise produced… Consequently, research aimed at obtaining and isolating such elements
valuable to medicinal production should be encouraged by means of the patent system.
Since the patent system provides insufficient incentive for encouraging research into
and production of biotechnological medicines which are needed to combat rare or ‘orphan’
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Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the legal
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and the national laws made in its shadow are interpreted.
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diseases, the Community and the Member States have a duty to respond adequately to this
problem.5

One finds in these paragraphs the yin and yang of European drug patenting policy preand post-TRIPs, including:
-

strong patents for the industry;
regulation to further public health and safety;
an eye to exports;
an eye to helping health care in developing countries.

Not all these aspirations have been fully realized in practice. The goals of
regulating drugs and helping developing (including least developed) countries have
taken a back seat to strong patents, exports, and licences for those who can afford
them.
For the pharmaceutical industry, perhaps two out of four is not bad; for public
policy, it is no passing grade. As a highly profitable industry, big pharma is an
aggressive lobbyist, litigator and strategist. Whatever tactics achieve the ultimate
goal of maximizing profits are employed. When it comes to drug approvals, the
transaction costs of securing country-by-country approval are trotted out as an
unreasonable burden that must be avoided. Here big pharma has pushed for and
largely succeeded in getting Europe-wide recognition of a single central approval.
When it comes to drug pricing, however, the tactic of “divide and conquer” operates.
Perversely, poorer countries typically end up paying more than richer countries. So in
2005 a month’s supply of Prozac cost €18.49 in Italy and €40.48 in Slovakia.6 The
obvious remedy is a single centralized European purchasing agency. Yet that
prescription is not pushed by big pharma, for the transaction costs of negotiating
country by country are as nothing compared to the gains derivable from territorial
price discrimination. Meanwhile Prozac is less available in Slovakia than in Italy. If
one makes the large assumption that prescribing more Prozac is on balance a good
thing,7 the prospect of more depressed Slovaks and more elated Italians seems
suboptimal public policy.
2. How TRIPs has affected European law
(a) Changes to EU or EPC law
European Patent Convention (EPC) members and the EU have taken various
measures to implement TRIPs. Thus, the EPC was updated in 2000 to ensure, inter
alia, TRIPs compliance.8 The definition of invention was amended to include all
fields of technology.9 What exactly falls within the concept of “technology”
5
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Cf. R. Moynihan & A. Cassels, Selling Sickness: How Drug Companies are Turning Us All into
Patients (2005).
8
Act Revising the Convention on the Grant of European Patents (Munich, 29 November 2000) (“EPC
2000”). The EPC 2000 will take effect by December 2007 since the necessary 15 states have now
ratified it.
9
As required by TRIPs, art. 27.1.
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nevertheless remains uncertain.10 Presumably some deference will be paid to national
or regional practices in areas such as genetics.
EPC 2000 also included a subtle but significant change in the provision under
which applications are monitored for compliance with principles of morality or ordre
public. Previously applications could be rejected if “exploitation” or “publication” of
the invention would contravene morality or ordre public. Now rejection can occur
only if “commercial exploitation” of the invention would so contravene – a less
irksome barrier for applicants.11
Another, less substantive, change is the switching of categories for the
exception disallowing patenting of methods of medical treatment. Previously, the
EPC categorized such inventions as unsusceptible of industrial application; now they
are unpatentable tout court.12 Mirroring TRIPs, the change implies that exclusion is
for public health policy reasons.13 Countries which treat medicine as a business more
than a social service may feel more relaxed with this placebo.
European directives to harmonize patenting standards for biotechnologies and
civil remedies for intellectual property infringement were issued in 1998 and 2004
respectively.14 Apart from ensuring TRIPs compliance, the avowed object was to
reduce distortions in trade and promote the smooth operation of the internal market.
Implementation of the biotech directive proved particularly controversial.
While the European Patent Office (EPO) quickly moved to make the standards of the
biotech directive equally the standards of the EPC, a significant number of member
states remained unhappy with the concept of patenting life forms and continued to
resist the directive. The European court of justice dismissed a constitutional challenge
to the EU’s competence to pass such a law15 but resisting states were slow to respond.
An exasperated European commission finally brought default proceedings against ten
member states.16 The ECJ quickly found the defendants to be in default. The
offenders eventually fell into line, except for Latvia and Luxembourg, which
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See Re CFPH LLC’s Patent Applications [2005] EWHC 1589 (Pat. Ct.): “Many have tried to frame
an acceptable definition [of technology], but to the best of my knowledge none have succeeded. It is
like the equally vexing question, ‘What is Art?’. The hard truth is this: concepts of that sort have no
existence, and words of that sort have no meaning, except by human convention; but human beings are
hopelessly in disagreement at the margin.”
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So EPC 1973 art. 53(a) monitors “inventions the publication or exploitation of which would be
contrary to ordre public or morality”; EPC 2000 art. 53(a) monitors only “inventions the commercial
exploitation of which would be contrary to ordre public or morality…” (our italics). The change,
following TRIPs art. 27.2, was already reflected by 1998 in art. 6.1 of the biotech directive, above note
3. See further, text below accompanying n. 63 ff.
12
The “method of medical treatment” exclusion in EPC 1973 art. 52(4) is shifted to EPC 2000 art.
53(c).
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Case No. G0001/04, Diagnostic Methods (Enlarged EPO Bd. App., 15 Dec. 2005), para. 10.
14
Biotech directive, above note 3; directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights, OJ L 157/ 45. For criticism of the
latter directive, see W.R. Cornish et al., “Procedures and Remedies for Enforcing IPRs: the EU
Commission’s Proposed Directive” [2003] 10 E.I.P.R. 447.
15
Case C-377/98, Netherlands v. Parliament and Council [2001] E.C.R. I-7079. The challenge was
initiated by the Netherlands and supported by Norway and Italy.
16
On 9 July 2003, proceedings were brought against the Germany, Austria, Belgium, France, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Sweden. In December 2004, two other proceedings were launched
against Latvia and Lithuania. See Report from the Commission to the Council and the European
Parliament, “Development and Implications of Patent Law in the Field of Biotechnology and Genetic
Engineering”, (Brussels 14 July 2005) COM(2005) 312.
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continued to procrastinate.17 National implementation has anyway not been uniform,
so that the overall harmonizing purpose of the directive has not been achieved.18
Another EU directive in 200419 to regulate drug marketing has some impact on
intellectual property rights. First, it states that drug testing by third parties during the
patent term for the purpose of seeking regulatory marketing approval does not
infringe any patent on the drug. This feature represents a sharp volte-face in EU
policy. Pushed by its big pharma clients, the EU had in 1999 brought a TRIPs
complaint against a similar provision in Canadian law, and also against Canada’s
allied provision permitting generic companies to make and stockpile drugs for the last
6 months of a patent to enable marketing immediately the patent expired. A WTO
panel ruled the stockpiling provision violated TRIPs but testing for regulatory
purposes did not.20
The decision on testing was hardly surprising. After all, German courts had
concluded that the exception in German patent law covering experiments (mirroring a
Community Patent Convention provision) allowed generic companies to conduct such
trials,21 and US law had contained a similar provision (the so-called Bolar exception)
for some years.22 So too had the laws of a number of states that joined the enlarged
EU in 2004. The change in EU policy means that the generic industry can now test
anywhere within the EU without having to shop for a friendly state or go offshore.
Secondly, the 2004 directive established a standardized 10-year term of
exclusive data protection for newly approved pharmaceutical products – effectively a
new genus of intellectual property right. This provision implemented the TRIPs
requirement that undisclosed data submitted for pharmaceutical marketing be
protected against unfair commercial use.23 Its essence is captured in an “8+2+1”
formula:
(i)
A generic applicant can file for approval on the 8th anniversary of the
patented product’s approval but will not get authorization until 2 years
later, on the 10th anniversary.
(ii)
Pharmaceutical companies can get another year’s protection for a new
therapeutic indication having a “significant clinical benefit in

17

Nina White, “The EU Biotech Directive - Legislation For Disharmony?” 1 (4) Pharmaceutical Law
Insight (October 2005). Italian implementation is scheduled for March 2006.
18
Thus, France and Germany, neither of which seems keen on gene patents, provide that patents on
gene sequences are limited to the specific disclosed function of the gene, not all functions: French
Intellectual Property code, arts. L 611-18 and L 613-2-1, inserted on 6 August 2004; German law on
implementation of the biotech directive (BGBI Nr. 6/2005, p. 146), in force as from 28 February 2005.
This limitation does not apply generally to product patents.
19
Directive 2004/27/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004, amending
Directive 2001/83/EC on the Community Code relating to medicinal products for human use, OJ L
136, 30/04/2004 P. 0034–0057. In a now familiar pattern, some states missed the October 2004
deadline for implementation.
20
Report of the Panel, Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, WT/DS114/R (17
March 2000), www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/7428d.pdf.
21
See in Germany: Clinical Trial I [1997] R.P.C. 623 and Clinical Trial II [1998] R.P.C. 423; W.R.
Cornish, “Experimental Use of Patented Inventions in European Community States” (1998) 29 IIC 735.
22
Roche Products Inc. v Bolar Pharm. Co. Inc., 733 F.2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1984), held that the
experimental use exception under US common law was not broad enough to let Bolar develop and
submit a generic product for regulatory approval before the expiry of Roche’s patent. In the US, the
Hatch-Waxman Act (Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-417, 98 Stat. 1585) introduced an exception overruling Bolar.
23
TRIPs, art. 39.3. The level of protection for such data is contentious, with developing countries
seeking a higher threshold than required in developed countries.
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comparison with existing therapies” if the indication is gained within
the first 8 years of marketing a product.24
Thirdly, the sort of strategy for which AstraZeneca was recently caught out,
where the initial marketing authorisation is changed to hamper generic or parallel
trade competition,25 is targeted by a provision that the initial authorisation for a
product covers any additional strengths, pharmaceutical forms, administration routes
and presentations, including variations and extensions.
Finally, a directive proposed in 2005 sought to criminalize intentional largescale intellectual property infringements as part of the fight against counterfeits,
including medicines.26 The proposal went beyond TRIPs requirements and included
patent infringements.27 This last feature drew criticism from a variety of patentsensitive industries including generic drug makers, who saw in it one more stick with
which big pharma, could, with little cost or risk to itself, beat them mercilessly.28 The
proposal was withdrawn in December 2005, partly prompted by a ruling from the
European court of justice that EU power over criminal law was less then plenary.29
The return of a revised proposal, presumably sans patents, was promised for early
2006.30
(b) TRIPs and the European Patent Convention
One area where Europe has fallen short on TRIPs is in that treaty’s relationship with
the EPC. All EU and EFTA states belong, along with others, to the EPC, but the EPC
is not an instrument of the European Union. The question has therefore arisen
whether EPC administrators and tribunals are bound by TRIPs. The quick and
obvious answer would be, surely yes. Those members of the World Trade
Organisation who are also EPC members must surely owe a WTO obligation to
ensure that the EPC is TRIPs compliant.
The quick and obvious answer is nevertheless wrong. Unlike the EU and its
member states, neither the European Patent Organisation nor its Office, is a WTO
24

The old EU directive, now replaced by 2004/27/EC, provided 10 years’ data exclusivity for products
subject to the EMEA centralized procedure, and 6 to 10 years for products going through member
states’ mutual recognition procedures, as each member state decided. National discretion is now
eliminated to avoid disparity: “What the EU Pharmaceutical Review Legislation Means for the New
Member States”, EU Bulletin (Hogan and Hartson, 1 March 2005).
25
In June 2005, the European competition commission found AstraZeneca had abused its dominant
position by obtaining longer patent terms – so-called supplementary protection certificates – from
national patent authorities by deception. It had also misused rules and procedures applied by national
medicines agencies responsible for issuing market authorisations, by selectively deregistering
authorisations for Losec capsules in Denmark, Norway and Sweden to block or delay entry by generic
firms and parallel traders. A fine of €60 million was imposed – and duly appealed: EU press release,
“Competition: Commission fines AstraZeneca €60 million for misusing patent system to delay market
entry of competing generic drugs” (IP/05/737, 15 June 2005).
26
Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on criminal measures aimed at ensuring
the enforcement of intellectual property rights, COM(2005)276 final (12 July 2005).
27
TRIPs art. 61 requires criminal proceedings to apply “at least in cases of wilful trademark
counterfeiting or copyright piracy”.
28
P. Meller, “Prison over patents? Proposed EU law unites foes”, International Herald Tribune (10-11
December 2005), 13.
29
Case C-176/03, Commission v. Council (13 September 2005), holding that the Community legislator
may enact criminal sanctions only to the extent necessary to ensure compliance with Community rules
and regulations.
30
“EC Withdraws Proposals to Harmonise Criminal Sanctions for Counterfeiting”,
www.iprights.com/publications/alerts/alerts.asp?alertID=270.
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member. Consequently, an enlarged EPO board of appeal ruled in 2004 that the EPO
can ignore TRIPs and, indeed, any other treaty not specifically mentioned in the
EPC.31 The case involved a drug patent applicant who claimed priority from a filing
in India at a time when India was a member of the WTO but not the Paris Convention.
TRIPs requires WTO members to recognize the Paris Convention, including its
provisions on priority dates. Yet the board of appeal held that the EPC laid down a
complete code of priority rules. Only filings in Paris Convention, not WTO, states
were mentioned. Saying the EPO was bound only by the language of the EPC and not
TRIPs, the board rejected the priority claim.
While the revised version of the EPC in 2000 corrects this anomaly by
including priority claims based on filings in WTO countries,32 the question remains
whether or not European states are in breach of their TRIPs obligations in this respect
until the revised EPC comes into force in 2007. Is it enough for EU members to state
that their national laws allow WTO nationals priority, while denying them the full
benefits of EPC filings?
(c) Europe and the Doha declaration
Pharmaceuticals and public health are not just issues for Europe or developing
countries. World health is involved. Consider the continuing saga of the AIDS
epidemic in Africa, and more recently the outbreak of bird flu that may, it is feared,
mutate into a virus that infects humans. Governments around the world are taking
emergency measures, including the stockpiling of anti-flu drugs. A patented antiviral
drug controlled by Roche is in demand after having lain dormant for years. Roche has
been hesitating to license others willing to take up the slack. The matter may yet
resolve itself but meanwhile poor nations cried foul. One knew trouble was afoot
when the drug was being bid for on eBay at up to 6 times its usual retail price.33
If indeed there is a pending emergency and not one cooked up by the media (at
time of writing, it is still hard to tell where the truth lies), then what should have been
done seems reasonably clear. An emergency should not have to be played out
according to the whims of the board of directors or licensing department of a right
holder. The rule should be “make and use now, pay later.” In the daily world, that’s
called buying on credit, and every seller who has plenty on stock is happy to let
anybody with a bank account take goods on their promise to pay. In the world of
patent law, however, that’s called infringement, and any patentee who cannot supply
the market can refuse to allow others to make “his” product, however much cash the
intending buyer offers.
The fear of hold-up is one reason why TRIPs allows compulsory licensing and
“public non-commercial use” of patents,34 and why most nations – including those of
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AstraZeneca’s Appn., G 2/02 & 3/02 (Enlarged EPO Bd. App., 26 April 2004). The decision
suggests the EPO is also not bound by the European Convention of Human Rights 1950 – an important
point, given the recent ruling that an unregistered trade mark is not protected as “property” under
ECHR art. 1: Affaire Anheuser-Busch Inc. c. Portugal (No. 73049/01, Eur. Ct. HR, 11 Oct. 2005). A
patent application, at least until grant, seems to be in the same situation.
32
EPC 2000, art. 87.
33
Tom Hundley, “Europeans Confront Contradictory Information on Avian Flu”, Chicago Tribune (24
Oct. 2005); Tom Wright, “Roche Picks Chinese Partner for Tamiflu”, International Herald Tribune,
Business section (13 Dec. 2005).
34
TRIPs, art. 31(b).
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Europe – have these palliatives in their national laws.35 In an emergency, national
laws may follow the “use now, pay later” principle. The United States has long had
such a law on its books,36 and its threatened use in 2001 during the anthrax scare
helped make treatment become available more quickly and cheaply than the patent
holder initially seemed willing to do.
The US law is not confined to emergencies. Nor is the law of some EU states.
For example, the UK government can authorize anyone to work a patent “for the
services of the Crown”, a broad term that includes “the production or supply of
specified drugs and medicines”.37 The government must compensate the right holder
for losses flowing from not being awarded the contract to make or supply. But if the
right holder had no existing capacity to take on the contract had it been offered, the
compensation awarded is likely zero.38 This rule mirrors the general law of damages
under which the victim of the breach of an obligation recovers only his actual, not his
notional, loss. Presumably the rule complies with the TRIPs obligation that patent
holders must have “adequate remuneration” for a “public non-commercial use”.39
Adequate remuneration does not mean windfalls from the public purse.
The problem for many developing countries is a lack of capacity to make their
own drugs, even (possibly especially) in an emergency; so they must rely on imports.
But TRIPs forbids compulsory or governmental use that is not “predominantly for the
supply of the domestic market of the Member authorising such use”.40 So the UK
could not authorize working a patent predominantly to export a needed drug to a
developing state, even in an emergency. A developing state could authorize the
import of drugs for an emergency or public non-commercial use, but the drugs could
come only from a state where the drug was unpatented or licensed for export by the
local patent holder, or where stocks were available as a byproduct of compulsory
licensing or public working for domestic use.
The difficulties in obtaining patented medicines at a reasonable price were
highlighted in 2001 when the compulsory licensing schemes of South Africa41 and
Brazil42 were challenged in legal proceedings. Both cases collapsed in the face of
intense international pressure, and were one reason for the Doha ministerial

35

The EPC contains nothing on compulsory licensing. The Community Patent Convention does
mention the phrase but merely tries to reconcile compulsory licensing provisions for national patents
with a “community patent” regime by, e.g., providing that compulsory licensing for national patents
also applies to a community patent (CPC art. 45) – if Europe gets around to creating one.
36
See J.H. Reichmann & C. Hasenzahl, Non-Voluntary Licensing of Patented Inventions: Historical
Perspective, Legal Framework under TRIPS, and an Overview of the Practice in Canada and the
United States of America (UNCTAD/ICTSD, Issue Paper No. 5, 2003), 5.
37
Patents Act 1977 (UK), ss. 55(1) & 56(2)(b).
38
Ibid., s. 57A. The government must pay compensation only if the right holder could have fulfilled
the contract had he been awarded it.
39
See TRIPs art. 31(h).
40
TRIPs art. 31(f).
41
A group of 39 pharmaceutical companies filed a case against South Africa before a domestic court in
1998 over proposed provisions in the Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act 1997
(SA) that facilitated compulsory licensing and parallel imports of medicines.
See
www.cptech.org/ip/health/sa/pharma-v-sa.html; also Edwin Cameron (with Jonathan Berger), “Patents
and Public Health: Principle, Politics and Paradox” (2004) Proceedings of the British Academy, in D.
Vaver, Intellectual Property Rights – Critical Concepts in Law (Routledge, 2006), vol. 4, 437.
42
The US complained to the WTO over Brazil’s scheme that allowed compulsory licensing if a patent
is not worked in Brazil: see WTO Panel, Report of the Panel on Brazil – Measures Affecting Patent
Protection, Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the United States, WT/DS199/3 (9 Jan. 2001),
http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/199-3.doc.
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declaration on TRIPs and public health in 2001.43 The declaration was intended to
make it easier for generic drugs to be manufactured and exported at low prices to the
countries that desperately needed them.
It took another two years for an interim mechanism to emerge to implement
the Doha declaration. In August 2003, the EU helped broker a deal under which the
WTO general council waived the TRIPs requirement limiting the import of patented
drugs from offshore generic companies, subject to strict conditions to discourage
arbitrage.44 The waiver ran in favour of least-developed countries, and other nations
that advised the WTO they wished to take advantage of it.45 Recently, in the run up to
the WTO ministerial conference in Hong Kong, members approved changes that
would convert this temporary waiver into a permanent TRIPs amendment.46
Individual European nations could have taken advantage of this waiver by
passing their own laws to allow quick export of cheap drugs to needy states.
Competition among states would have likely produced the most effective law.
Instead, the European commission proposed an implementing regulation to supplant
national initiatives.47 The initial proposal made the process of getting a compulsory
licence so unattractive that few sane generic suppliers would likely have used it.
Fortunately, several rounds of amendment removed many objectionable features,48
and the European parliament duly approved the proposal in December 2005.
The regulation has its good points. It covers exports to all poor countries,
whether members of the WTO or not.49 Normally, before filing for a licence, the
applicant must submit evidence of unsuccessful negotiations with the right holder
within the past 30 days; but this requirement does not apply to cases of national
emergency, extreme urgency and “public non-commercial use”.50 Moreover, a vague
duty to remunerate the right holder adequately has been changed to a liability for a
maximum 4% of the total price paid by or for the importing country,51 a figure that
43

Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (WTO Doc WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 of 20
November 2001).
44
WTO General Council, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration the TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health, WT/L/540 (30 Aug., 2003),
http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/L/540.doc.
45
A number of countries indicated they would not use the system. See generally “Compulsory
licensing of pharmaceuticals and TRIPS”,
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/public_health_faq_e.htm. For a fuller discussion of the process
leading to the 2003 waiver, see D. Matthews, “Is History Repeating Itself? The Outcome of
Negotiations on Access to Medicines, the HIV/AIDS Pandemic and Intellectual Property Rights in the
World Trade Organisation”, 2004(1) Law, Social Justice & Global Development Jo.,
www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/lgd/2004_1/matthews/.
46
This will be formally incorporated into TRIPs if two thirds of WTO members ratify the change by 1
December 2007. The waiver remains in force until then:
www.wto.org/english/news_e/news05_e/trips_decision_e.doc.
47
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on compulsory licensing of
patents relating to the manufacturer of pharmaceutical products for export to countries with public
health problems, Interinstitutional file 2004/0258 (COD), Council of the EU, 9 December 2005. This
regulation awaits an EU Council vote to come into force.
48
E.g., contrary to the Doha waiver, the original proposal required the intending applicant to negotiate
with the right holder before filing a licence application, even where the WTO member had declared “a
situation of national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency.”
49
Covered non-WTO countries are those appearing on the OECD Development Assistance
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may well become the rule of thumb in the ordinary compulsory licensing case.52 To
benefit fully from these provisions, importing states will no doubt ensure their laws
include broad governmental use powers like those of the US or UK.
The problems with the scheme are mainly procedural. It is meant to
encourage swift and easy licensing. That object could have been attained by a
“licence of right” scheme, where the application is granted virtually automatically on
provision of the bare minima required by the WTO waiver. Any appeal would not
affect continuing manufacture or supply. But the regulation has not taken this route.
The model adopted is the typical national compulsory licensing scheme. After
application, right holders can comment and provide relevant information, and
applicants can correct errors.53 “Any decision” of the tribunal and any “disputes
concerning compliance with the conditions of the licence” can then be appealed under
national law. Appeals may be given “a suspensory effect.”54
The standard theory behind a scheme of this sort is that few will need to use it
in practice: right holders will prefer to negotiate their own deals rather than be stuck
as a compulsory licensor under imposed terms.55 The problem is that this sanguine
theory rarely worked in practice, and especially where pharmaceuticals were
involved. In the heady pre-TRIPs days of compulsory licensing in Canada,
pharmaceutical companies found it more profitable to oppose virtually every
application and appeal or seek judicial review, often several times, on every possible
and sometimes impossible point.56 Delay was the name of the game.57 The applicant
might eventually be worn down by rising costs and passage of time, and in any event
the patentee got to enjoy its monopoly fully for a few more months or years while the
application was tied up in the legal system.
This scenario may not reoccur under the new scheme, but chances are quite
high that it will. Other countries -- Canada, India and China -- have set up their own
regimes.58 The country with the most efficient scheme may turn out to be the major
exporter of this class of generic medicine.
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3. How bilateral agreements since TRIPs have affected Europe
Europe does not presently compel other states to increase the level of patent rights
beyond TRIPs, in the way the US is acting. Rather, its policy seems to be to ensure
that the domestic law of its trading partners is framed to comply with most recent
international norms: TRIPs of course, but also the Paris convention and the patent cooperation treaty.59 For countries wanting to join the EU, the early adoption of laws
that mirror the EU’s is a sort of pre-entrance test.
There is a subtlety to this stand-back policy. The US is left to do the running
on raising the patent hurdles in free trade agreements as part of its overall strategy to
raise global intellectual property levels of protection. One purpose is to stack the
deck even higher in favour of big pharma in its never-ending war against generic
imitators, wherever they are and wherever they market or export their products.
The US may negotiate the national and regional free trade agreements
bilaterally, but the agreements also benefit Europe, including foreign companies with
European bases.
Consider the issue of what categories of inventions are patentable. Once a
new standard of patentability becomes part of domestic law and is extended to that
country’s nationals because of a bilateral trade agreement, that country must, under
the national treatment requirements of the WTO agreement or Paris convention, also
extend that standard to the nationals of all other WTO and Paris Convention states –
including European states. At some point, the standard may become so prevalent as
to become a new norm of international law. The stage is then set for the inclusion of
such a term in the next round of TRIPs negotiations, causing non-observance to
become subject to sanction under TRIPs disputes resolution procedures.
How bilateralism affects international standards may be examined by
considering the question of patentable subject-matter – what kind of inventions are
patentable – a little more closely.
The US plainly regards the exceptions to patentability contained in the EPC as
a piece of European quirkiness that does not belong in a “proper” patent regime – i.e.,
a regime that looks like its own. So, when negotiating a free trade agreement, the US
starts by insisting that all “technology” be potentially patentable (as TRIPs art. 27.1
provides) and then goes on to demand the elimination of all exceptions that TRIPs
allows states to make to this general provision. The TRIPs provisions are now what
allows EPC states, the EU and its members to continue comparable exceptions in the
EPC, in EU directives (such as the biotech directive) and in national laws.60
The most important medical exceptions are of course those which allow
“diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of humans or animals”
to be excluded from patentability (“the medical exception”).61 Of lesser, but still
some, importance is the “public order” provision allowing members to exclude from
patentability
inventions, the prevention within their territory of the commercial exploitation of which is
necessary to protect ordre public or morality, including to protect human, animal or plant life
or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the environment, provided that such exclusion is not
made merely because the exploitation is prohibited by their law.62
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In the US-Chile Free Trade Agreement (FTA) of 2003, one finds that Chile can no
longer carve out these exceptions from patentability. The Agreement requires all
technology to be patentable but it also eliminates the power of either party to include
a medical or public order exception.63
At first sight, the US-Australia FTA of 2004 is different: the medical and
public order exceptions can continue.64 But analysis reveals this “concession” to be
no concession at all. Before the FTA, Australian courts had already signalled their
intention to allow the patenting of virtually anything despite an exception that allowed
refusal of patents that would be “generally inconvenient.” This language, a hangover
from the first English patent law of 1624, was rendered almost meaningless by a 2001
Australian court decision which allowed methods of medical treatment to be patented
for the first time.65 The court seemed hard pressed to think of anything that would be
too “inconvenient” to be patented.
Clearly, US negotiators gambled that the FTA would not prompt Australia to
reverse the course its courts had taken with overt approval from the usual propatenting suspects. The negotiators gambled right. Apart from retaining its ban on
patenting human beings and biological processes for human generation, Australia did
not amend its patent law to take advantage of any of the TRIPs exceptions from
patentability.
Consider also the US-Central American FTA,66 where a patent owner can
have the term of the patent extended where the grant was unreasonably delayed. Five
years after application or three years after a request for examination is treated as an
unreasonable period except where the patent owner causes the delay.67 A
pharmaceutical patent may also be extended where the need to get marketing approval
results in an “unreasonable curtailment” of the drug’s first commercial marketing.68
Those provisions are familiar in both the US and Europe, but none is mandated by
TRIPs or any other international treaty.
Three points may be made on the inclusion of TRIPs-plus standards in
bilateral agreements as they affect relations between Europe and other states:
(1) Different standards can create inequality, and here they do, at least at the margin.
Europeans can patent in TRIPs-plus nations what they may be unable to patent at
home. Conversely, TRIPs-plus nationals may be unable to patent in Europe what they
can patent at home. Europeans can also freely imitate and use in Europe and
elsewhere whatever is disclosed in such TRIPs-plus patents. If that technology is
developed to produce TRIPs-qualifying technology, it may be patented in Europe
without the foreign TRIPs-plus patentee’s consent and without compensating him.
The small piece of good news here for TRIPs-plus countries comes from the
course of EPO decisions on the patentability exceptions. The EPO cannot legally
63
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adopt the maxim endorsed by the US supreme court, and currently enthusiastically
followed by the US patent office, that “everything under the sun that is made by man”
is patentable – a test that has led to the patenting of computer programs, business
methods and ideas, including most recently a method of calculating the pay of
company executives, even if the sum can be done on one’s fingers instead of a
computer.69 As one US text says “[it] is hardly an exaggeration to say that under
current law, if you can name it, you can claim it.”70 Only the presence of the TRIPs
exceptions in the EPC prevents the EPO from directly parroting the US approach.
But the EPO is doing the next best thing. It has implicitly adopted the maxim
that “almost anything under the sun that is made by man” is patentable.71 This
legerdemain is accomplished by interpreting the EPC exceptions very narrowly.
Take the provision in EPC art. 52(4) that “diagnostic methods practised on the
human or animal body shall not be regarded as inventions which are susceptible of
industrial application”. EPO decisions indicate that if the method is only part of
making a diagnosis, in that it produces only interim results and not an actual
diagnosis, or if it is performed outside the human body (e.g., on blood samples taken
from the body), then it is outside the exception and patentable.72 That niggardly
approach is applied to all the exceptions – except exceptions to exceptions. So, for
example, the exception in EPC art. 54(5) to the patentability exception in EPC art.
52(4), allowing patenting of any substance or composition for use in a diagnostic or
medical method, is interpreted broadly.73 It has been said that “[a]n exception to an
exception is apt to produce messy jurisprudence”;74 and so it does here.
The result nevertheless is that in practice only a relatively thin slice of material
is not patentable in Europe where it would be patentable in the US.
(2) A larger piece of good news for nations that wish to maintain TRIPs exceptions to
patentability is that they should be able to implement and apply them more broadly
than does the EPO. TRIPs does not require its exclusions to be read as narrowly as
the EPO reads the EPC counterparts. For example, TRIPs should not prevent states
from excluding from patentability both partial and entire diagnoses, whether
performed on or outside the human body, whatever view the EPO may eventually take
on the issue.
69

Ex p. Lundgren, 76 USPQ 2d 1385 (PTO BAI 2005).
R.E. Schechter & J.B. Thomas, Intellectual Property: The Law of Copyrights, Patent and
Trademarks (Thomson West, 2003), 292.
71
The technology must of course also satisfy the other standard criteria that it be new and non-obvious
and involve a technical contribution.
72
See Tina Piper, “A History of the Diagnostic Methods Exception from Patentability” (MPhil,
Oxford, thesis, 2004), pp. 72 ff. The maverick holding in R v. Cygnus [2002] E.P.O.R. 26 (Tech. Bd.
App.), construing the exception more broadly to cover diagnoses producing only interim results, was
sharply criticized by the patent community: e.g., T.W. Roberts, “Methods of Diagnosis: Request for an
Opinion from the Enlarged Board of Appeal” (2002) Chartered Institute of Patent Agents Jo. 73. The
decision is now disapproved: Diagnostic Methods, above n. 13.
73
Method of Administration of IGF-1/Genentech Inc., Case No. T 1020/03-3.3.4 (EPO Tech. Bd. App.,
29 October 2004). The claims were for the use of insulin-like growth factor (IGF-1) in preparing a
medicament to be administered to mammals “so as to sustain its biological response in the treatment of
a chronic disorder in the mammal” and a treatment regime consisting of intermittent periods of
administration of a “therapeutically effective” amount of IGF-1. The board allowed the patenting of
second medical use claims directed to the use of a composition for manufacture of a medicament for a
specified new and inventive therapeutic application, where the novelty of the application might lie only
in the dose to be used or the manner of application.
74
Rees v. Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust [2003] UKHL 52 at para. 143.
70

15

(3) A state that cannot, under a TRIPs-plus treaty, exclude material for medical and
public order grounds may nevertheless be able to exclude it for other reasons. US
courts until the late 20th century interpreted the “utility” that is required for a US
patent to include “social” utility. Patent laws were not passed to encourage socially
useless or detrimental inventions. The examples given in early 19th century US case
law included “a new invention to poison people, or to promote debauchery, or to
facilitate private assassination.”75 These inventions and a miscellany of others, such as
inventions promoting gambling or deceptive practices, remained unpatentable as late
as 1977.76
An invention to poison people should be considered unpatentable as contrary
to ordre public or morality under the EPC. A nation should be able legally to adopt a
definition of utility that would exclude such an invention as “not useful” – that is,
unless a TRIPs-plus agreement positively forbids this or redefines utility
exhaustively.77
Whether a state could go further and bring other medical or public order
exceptions under “utility” is unclear. Thus, New Zealand’s exception to patentability
– the “generally inconvenient” ground also found in Australia – has been interpreted,
contrary to the position taken by Australian courts, to exclude methods of medical
treatment.78 The same result could follow to the extent concepts of “general
inconvenience” and inutility overlap, as ontologically and teleologically they may.
4. How user rights should be viewed under TRIPs
In a useful article, Professor Correa lists what he calls “exceptions” or “exclusions” to
patent rights that by international practice seem acceptable under TRIPs art. 30.79
Those provisions, which are all important in the public health context, include:
- acts done privately and on a non-commercial scale, or for a non-commercial
purpose;
- use of the invention for research;
- use of the invention for teaching purposes;
- experimentation on the invention to test or improve on it;
- preparation of medicines under individual prescriptions;
75
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experiments made for the purposes of seeking regulatory approval for the
marketing of a product after the expiration of the patent;
use of the invention by a third party that had used it bona fide before the date
of application of the patent.80

The only contentious point about this list is the description used for it:
“exceptions” or “exclusions”. The usage is common enough; indeed the marginal note
to TRIPs article 30 calls these permitted activities “Exceptions to Rights Conferred”.
Yet the usage is potentially mischievous and should be avoided.
Nothing in TRIPs eliminates the basic idea that patents involve a balance of
rights between patent holders and the public. Nor does TRIPs affirm the out-dated
idea that patents are natural rights. Most nations accept that patents are there to
encourage innovation and disseminate practical knowledge. Rewarding inventors,
while preserving a lively public domain for the public – non-inventors – to browse
and think (and perhaps even also become inventors), is a means to that end.
TRIPs itself affirms the notion of balance in article 7; intellectual property
rights should:
contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and
dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of
technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare,
and to a balance of rights and obligations.

The US similarly maintains in its constitution, in a provision that no treaty can
remove or modify, that patents are there to “promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts”.81
Intellectual property law is not just the law of intellectual property right
holders; it must take into account, and may be subject to, other imperatives. Thus, the
biotech directive provides in recital 16:
Patent law must be applied so as to respect the fundamental principles safeguarding the
dignity and integrity of the person.

Another recital recalls that rights and obligations recognized by the European
Convention on Human Rights 1950 and by national constitutional traditions must be
respected, as must principles of ordre public and morality.82 Human rights may
adjust to intellectual property in some respects, but so must intellectual property rights
adjust to them. TRIPs art. 7 is one way to achieve this. After all, TRIPs is just a trade
treaty. Trade is not superior to everything else. Crudely put: a dead person needs no
rights, least of all a right to trade. To have and to exercise a right to trade presupposes
the existence and enforcement of other enabling rights.
How then is the balance of rights between intellectual property holders and
users to be conceptually established? Certainly not by referring to the activities of
users as “exceptions” or “exclusions”, and proceeding to interpret “rights” broadly
and “exceptions” narrowly. Canadian jurisprudence suggests an answer. Canada is a
significant jurisdiction particularly because it embraces both common law and civilian
80
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traditions, including those of intellectual property. In a 2004 decision involving
copyright, the Canadian supreme court unanimously declined to analyze the right of
users to deal fairly with copyright works as an exception. Instead it preferred a
concept of “user rights” that formed an integral part of the balance that produced the
copyright system. For what balance is achieved by weighing “rights” against
“exceptions”?
Two citations from the court’s judgment indicate the approach. The first is its
approval of a passage from one of its earlier decisions:
The Copyright Act is usually presented as a balance between promoting the public interest in
the encouragement and dissemination of works of the arts and intellect and obtaining a just
reward for the creator . . .The proper balance among these and other public policy objectives
lies not only in recognizing the creator's rights but in giving due weight to their limited
nature. In interpreting the Copyright Act, courts should strive to maintain an appropriate
balance between these two goals.83

The second passage applies this balance:
Before reviewing the scope of the fair dealing exception under the Copyright Act, it is
important to clarify some general considerations about exceptions to copyright infringement.
Procedurally, a defendant is required to prove that his or her dealing with a work has been
fair; however, the fair dealing exception is perhaps more properly understood as an integral
part of the Copyright Act than simply a defence. Any act falling within the fair dealing
exception will not be an infringement of copyright. The fair dealing exception, like other
exceptions in the Copyright Act, is a user’s right. In order to maintain the proper balance
between the rights of a copyright owner and users’ interests, it must not be interpreted
restrictively. As Professor Vaver, [in Copyright Law (2000)], has explained, at p. 171: “User
rights are not just loopholes. Both owner rights and user rights should therefore be given the
fair and balanced reading that befits remedial legislation.”
As an integral part of the scheme of copyright law, the s. 29 fair dealing exception is always
available.84

What is true of copyright is no less true of patents and any other intellectual
property. TRIPs art. 30 may refer to exceptions to patent rights but in fact these
exceptions constitute the rights users hold against patent holders. In this way, the
“balance of rights and obligations”, to which TRIPs art. 7 alludes as an objective of
intellectual property law, is given practical effect in the patent field.
5. Are patents in the public health field a special case?
Not only must the concept of user rights be clearly recognized in the field of health
care patents, but so also must these patents be recognized as special cases.
Health care patents are not the same as patents for improvements to toasters.
Health care patents deal with human life and health. These values are not mere
market commodities like toasters. The holders of health care patents certainly have
rights; they may also fairly be placed under a duty to deal, and a duty to act
reasonably in their dealings, in the light of the subject-matter of their patent.
In former days certain activities were regarded as involving special duties.
The innkeeper could not refuse to provide food and lodgings to the passerby who
needed to stay the night and had money to pay. The keeper could not ask an
outrageous sum even if (particularly if) his inn were the only one for miles. His spot
83
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monopoly placed him under a special duty to deal, and to deal honestly. So it was
with common carriers: they were bound to carry goods but could not legally charge
more than a reasonable price for the service. If they did, the excess was recoverable if
paid under protest.85
Similarly, the salvage vessel which comes to the aid of a person hanging on to
a plank in the middle of the ocean cannot charge any sum it likes to rescue him. If it
does, the result may be an unconscionable bargain that is universally held
unenforceable. There is no legal or moral duty on the rescued victim to pay anything
beyond a reasonable price for the service. What is reasonable depends on the effort
involved, and what is necessary to provide a reasonable incentive for others to act
according to the golden rule.86
Why should not the provision of patented health care products be similarly
conceived?
In October 2005, the Economist prefaced a special survey on patents and
technology with a quote from one of its issues from 1851:
The granting [of] patents ‘inflames cupidity’, excites fraud, stimulates men to run after
schemes that may enable them to levy a tax on the public, begets disputes and quarrels betwixt
inventors, provokes endless lawsuits… The principle of the law from which such
consequences flow cannot be just.87

Today’s Economist is more accepting of the system. Yet we can recognize the
contemporary truths contained in that passage from 1851. In the health care field, as
in others, the challenge is to create a system where “the principle of the law” does in
fact create “just” consequences.

85

R. Goff & G. Jones, The Law of Restitution, 5th ed. (1999), 325.
Cf. ibid., ch. 18, dealing primarily with salvage of ships at sea.
87
Economist, “A Market for Ideas: A Survey of Patents and Technology”, October 22nd 2005, p. 2.
86

